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CASE NOTE

THE FUTURE OF RECESS APPOINTMENTS AFTER THE
DECISION OF THE D.C. CIRCUIT IN NOEL CANNING V. NLRB

JAMES M. H OBBS†
INTRODUCTION
President Obama outraged congressional Republicans in early 2012
when he used his recess appointment power to name the ﬁrst Director of
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and three new members to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).1 The President made
the appointments despite pro forma Senate sessions speciﬁcally designed to
prevent him from ﬁlling the positions.2 Partisans from both sides of the
aisle immediately jumped in. Were these intrasession recess appointments
an example of the President “arrogantly circumvent[ing] the American
people . . . . [in] a sharp departure from a longstanding precedent”?3 Or
were the pro forma sessions nothing more than a “gimmick” created to

† Alumni & Philanthropy Chair, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Volume 162. J.D.
Candidate, 2014, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2011, Colorado College. I would
like to thank the editors of the Law Review for their work on this piece, particularly Jessica Rice
and Bianca Nunes. All remaining errors are my own.
1 See Press Release, Oﬃce of the Press Sec’y, President Obama Announces Recess Appointments to Key Administration Posts (Jan. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Recess Appointment Press Release],
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-oﬃce/����/�1/04/president-obama-announcesrecess-appointments-key-administration-posts. Senator Mitch McConnell called the move
“unprecedented” and argued that it placed the appointees “in uncertain legal territory.” Laura
Meckler, Obama Appoints Cordray to Lead Consumer Bureau, W ALL S T. J. (Jan. 4, 2012), http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203471004577140552133809784.html.
2 See Meckler, supra note 1.
3 Id. (quoting Senator McConnell).
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threaten “the President’s constitutional authority to make appointments to
keep the government running”?4
Barely a year later, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals waded into the
debate when it decided Noel Canning v. NLRB.5 In a “bombshell”6 ruling
that has been described as “surprisingly broad,” 7 the panel unanimously
declared the President’s appointments to the NLRB unconstitutional.8 Of
the three other federal appellate courts to consider the scope of the recess
appointment power, all have reached conclusions wholly opposite to that of
Noel Canning.9 The reasoning of the D.C. Circuit’s decision would have
invalidated the majority of recess appointments made by U.S. presidents
from Ronald Reagan forward.10
President Obama’s recess appointments were politically controversial,
but all then-existing case law suggested they were constitutional. Still, the
Supreme Court had never clariﬁed the precise parameters of the Recess
Appointments Clause.11 Private litigants relied on that gray area to challenge the oﬃcial acts of recess appointees. This case began as a run-of-themill labor dispute, but took on greater significance when Noel Canning challenged the recess appointments and the NLRB’s authority. On appeal before
the D.C. Circuit, the validity of the appointments became the central issue.
Acknowledging its departure from the reasoning of its sister circuits, a
panel of the D.C. Circuit unanimously declared the President’s appointments
unconstitutional because it interpreted the Recess Appointments Clause as

4 Dan Pfeiﬀer, America’s Consumer Watchdog, W HITE H OUSE B LOG (Jan. 4, 2012, 10:45
AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/01/04/americas-consumer-watchdog.
5 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013).
6 Carrie Johnson, Court Ruling Upsets Conventional Wisdom on Recess Appointments, NPR (Jan.
25, 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/01/25/170293179/court-ruling-upsets-conventional
-wisdom-on-recess-appointments.
7 Aruna Viswanatha & Terry Baynes, U.S. Court Rules Obama’s Appointments Unconstitutional,
R EUTERS (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/25/usa-obama-appointmentsidUSL1N0AU68520130125.
8 Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 506-07.
9 Id. at 509 (acknowledging contrary holdings in the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits).
10 Of the 652 recess appointments made since January 20, 1981, roughly 329 would be invalidated for having occurred during intrasession recesses. Congressional Distribution Memorandum
from Henry B. Hogue et al., Cong. Research Serv., on the Noel Canning Decision and Recess
Appointments Made from 1981-2013, at 4 tbl.1 (Feb. 4, 2013) [hereinafter Hogue Memo], available at
http://democrats.edworkforce.house.gov/sites/democrats.edworkforce.house.gov/ﬁles/documents/�
12/pdf/Recess%20Appointments%201981-2013.pdf. The Congressional Research Service estimates
that “many” of the intersession recess appointments would also be void because they ﬁlled
vacancies that arose prior to the recess during which the appointments were made. See id. at 3.
11 See infra text accompanying note 17.
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permitting appointments only during intersession—not intrasession—recesses.12
Two judges went further, and invalidated the appointments under the
alternative theory that the President can only use the recess appointment
power to ﬁll positions that become vacant during the recess in which the
appointments are made.13 The decision appeared to hamstring the NLRB
and the newly formed CFPB.
The logic of Noel Canning, which draws heavily on a formalistic reading
of the original meaning and purpose of the power, signiﬁcantly narrows the
scope of the Recess Appointments Clause in a manner that could “virtually
eliminate the recess appointment power for all future presidents at a time
when it has become increasingly diﬃcult to win Senate conﬁrmation for
nominees.”14 Previous courts placed greater value on the functional, government-enabling beneﬁts of an expansive reading of the clause. Both
interpretations are reasonable, but they also reﬂect the diﬀering value
judgments of the deciding courts.
Noel Canning created a clear circuit split on a critical constitutional issue,
and the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari.15 Now the Court must
balance the same values and make its own determination as to the future of
recess appointments. The outcome of Noel Canning is incredibly diﬃcult to
predict. The Court could resolve the case in a number of diﬀerent ways, and
the various fundamental issues at stake cannot be divided easily along
ideological lines.
Part I of this Note explores how courts have interpreted the Recess
Appointments Clause in the past. Part II recounts the underlying facts of
Noel Canning and outlines the arguments of the D.C. Circuit’s majority and
concurring opinions. Part III considers the implications of the D.C. Circuit’s ruling for the NLRB and CFPB, and discusses the Supreme Court’s
decision to grant certiorari in this case.
I. JUDICIAL T REATMENT OF THE R ECESS A PPOINTMENTS
C LAUSE BEFORE N OEL CANNING
The Constitution provides two methods by which the President may
appoint oﬃcers of the United States. Under the ﬁrst, “he shall nominate,
and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
12
13
14

Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 505-07.
Id. at 514; see also id. at ��� (Griﬃth, J., concurring).
Charlie Savage & Steven Greenhouse, Court Rejects Obama Move to Fill Posts, N.Y. T IMES
(Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/business/court-rejects-recess-appointmentsto-labor-board.html.
15 NLRB v. Noel Canning, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013).
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Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme
Court, and all other Oﬃcers of the United States, whose Appointments are
not herein otherwise provided for.”16 The second method, known as the
Recess Appointments Clause, follows the ﬁrst and provides, “[t]he President
shall have Power to ﬁll up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess
of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of
their next Session.”17
These provisions appear straightforward on their face, but they are surprisingly open-textured. 18 One scholar aptly observed that the Recess
Appointments Clause hits a sort of constitutional sweet spot: “There are
stakes, but they are not too high; there is substantial text to work with, but
no shortage of interpretive issues.”19
Three questions shape the interpretive debate. First, what does the term
“Recess” mean? Speciﬁcally, does it include only breaks between sessions
(intersession recesses) or are breaks within a given session (intrasession
recesses) encompassed as well? Second, does the phrase “Vacancies that may
happen” mean that the President can ﬁll positions that happen to be vacant
during the recess or only vacancies that come into existence during the
recess? Finally, does the clause permit recess appointments to Article III
courts? Earlier appellate court opinions consistently favored the broader
reading of the clause on each of these issues.20

16
17
18

U.S. C ONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
U.S. C ONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
For the origins of the concept of open texture in the law, see H.L.A. H ART, T HE C ONCEPT OF L AW 124-29 (2d ed. 1994). For a useful treatment of the concept, see Cass R. Sunstein,
Problems with Rules, 83 C ALIF. L. R EV. 953, 984 (1995). Professor Sunstein explains,
[R]ules have an “open texture,” stemming from two factors: the rule-makers’ ignorance of fact and the rule-makers’ indeterminacy of aim. No law is issued with full
knowledge of the factual situations to which it will be applied, and no law is enacted
with full understanding of or agreement on its animating purposes.
Id. (footnote omitted).
19 Michael Herz, Abandoning Recess Appointments?: A Comment on Hartnett (and Others), 26
C ARDOZO L. R EV. 443, 443 (2005).
20 See Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (upholding the intrasession appointment of a circuit court judge); United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir.
1985) (en banc) (upholding the intersession appointment of a district court judge to a vacancy that
existed before the recess began); United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1962) (same); In
re Farrow, 3 F. 112 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1880) (upholding the recess appointment of a federal appellate
judge to a vacancy that arose when the Senate was in session).
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Prior to Noel Canning, only one court had directly considered the validity
of recess appointments made during intrasession recesses. 21 In Evans v.
Stephens, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the intrasession recess appointment of
Circuit Judge Pryor, in an opinion built upon respect for the executive
branch’s longstanding interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause;
the clause’s plain meaning; historical use of intrasession appointments; and
the pragmatic, government-facilitating purpose of the provision. 22 The
court argued that the pragmatic purpose of the clause is simply to allow the
President to make appointments when the Senate’s advice is unavailable,
regardless of the type of recess. 23 This interpretation is supported by
scholars who view the recess power in a similarly pragmatic light,24 or who
believe political forces are suﬃcient to check presidential overreach.25 The
opposing view—that the Constitution only allows for recess appointments
between oﬃcial sessions of Congress—had never been expressed in a
majority opinion, but a vigorous dissent in Evans presaged the reasoning of
Noel Canning. 26 Some scholars also challenged the Evans decision by
presenting alternative interpretations of the clause’s purpose, complicating
the historical record relied on by the Evans majority, and calling for greater
attention to the original intent of the Framers.27

21 See Evans, 387 F.3d at 1221, 1224 (determining the constitutionality of a recess appointment
made during a two-week break in the Senate’s session).
22 See id. at 1226 (“[G]iven the words of the Constitution and the history, we are unpersuaded
by the argument that the recess appointment power may only be used in an intersession recess,
but not an intrasession recess. Furthermore, what we understand to be the main purpose of the
Recess Appointments Clause—to enable the President to ﬁll vacancies to assure the proper
functioning of our government—supports [our conclusion].”).
23 See id. This is particularly persuasive in light of the fact that intrasession recesses may
actually be longer than their intersession counterparts. See id. at n.10 (noting that intersession recesses
have been as short as zero days, while some intrasession recesses have lasted several months).
24 See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Recess Appointments of Article III Judges: Three Constitutional
Questions, 26 C ARDOZO L. R EV. 377, 427-41 (2005) (adopting a functional perspective on the
Recess Appointments Clause and arguing for a broad interpretation); Herz, supra note 19, at 456�� (exploring the diﬃculty of interpreting the clause in light of conﬂicting purposes, but
ultimately rejecting those arguments based solely on original purpose).
25 See Patrick Hein, Comment, In Defense of Broad Recess Appointment Power: The Eﬀectiveness
of Political Counterweights, 96 C ALIF. L. R EV. 235, 252-56 (2008) (noting that political checks on
the President may be the most eﬀective limitation on the recess appointment power).
26 See Evans, 387 F.3d at 1228-38 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
27 See, e.g., Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52
UCLA L. R EV. 1487, 1547-73 (2005) (employing extensive historical research to argue for a
limited reading of the Recess Appointments Clause that would not permit intrasession appointments); Michael A. Carrier, Note, When Is the Senate in Recess for Purposes of the Recess Appointments
Clause?, 92 M ICH. L. R EV. 2204, 2230 (1994) (objecting to intrasession recess appointments as
inconsistent with original intent).
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Turning to the second constitutional question, federal appellate courts
consistently have held that vacancies need not arise during the recess to be
properly ﬁlled by recess appointments. 28 Again, these courts have been
motivated by pragmatic realities—if you want a functioning government,
why should it matter whether a vacancy begins on the last day of a session
or the ﬁrst day of a recess?29 Each court also draws on “written executive
interpretations from as early as 1823, and legislative acquiescence” in the
President’s broad exercise of the recess appointment power.30 Commentators who support an expansive view of the ﬁrst constitutional question also
tend to support appointments that ﬁll vacancies that “happen to exist”—as
opposed to only those that ﬁll vacancies that “happen to arise”—for similar
practical and structural reasons.31 This view is not universal, however. A
dissenting opinion on this question criticized the Evans majority’s reliance
on a single statute to demonstrate congressional acquiescence and argued
that the majority interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause threatened to swallow the primary method of Senate conﬁrmation. 32 Scholars
have also conducted extensive historical research to make a legitimate case
that the executive branch’s view of this issue has not been as consistent as
the majority perspective suggests.33 At least one nineteenth-century court
held that the President could ﬁll a vacancy only when it arose during the
recess, 34 further complicating the narrative of the majority view. Still,

28 See, e.g., Evans, 387 F.3d at 1226-27; United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1012-13 (9th
Cir. 1985) (en banc); United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 709-15 (2d Cir. 1962); In re Farrow, 3
F. 112, 115-16 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1880).
29 See, e.g., Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1012 (asserting that adopting the “happen to arise” interpretation “would lead to the absurd result that all oﬃces vacant on the day the Senate recesses would
have to remain vacant at least until the Senate reconvenes”); Allocco, 305 F.2d at 712 (arguing that
restricting the President’s recess power to “vacancies which arise while the Senate is away” would
lead to “Executive paralysis and do violence to the orderly functioning of our complex government”).
30 Evans, 387 F.3d at 1226 (citing Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1012; Allocco, 305 F.2d at 709-15; and
Farrow, 3 F. 112).
31 See, e.g., Hartnett, supra note 24, at 381-407 (providing an extensive argument in favor of a
“happen to exist” interpretation and critiquing opponents’ use of early historical sources); Herz,
supra note 19, at 445-47 (arguing that although the text may support a “happen to arise” interpretation, because of the text’s ambiguity, “considerations of purpose become critical and are suﬃcient
to trump the text”); see also Hein, supra note 25, at 258-60 (summarizing the arguments in favor of
the “happen to exist” interpretation).
32 See Evans, 387 F.3d at 1235-36 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
33 See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 27, at 1501-38 (using historical research to support a more
restrictive reading of “happen”). For some of the strongest early sources corroborating this
position, see infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
34 See In re Dist. Attorney of U.S., 7 F. Cas. 731, 736, 744 (E.D. Pa. 1868) (No. 3924) (invalidating recess appointment of U.S. Attorney because the vacancy did not arise during the recess).
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before Noel Canning, no appellate court had ever accepted the “happen to
arise” interpretation.
Finally, courts have unanimously held that Article III judges can be appointed
through the recess appointment mechanism.35 This question is not at issue
in Noel Canning, but the D.C. Circuit’s narrow reading of the Recess
Appointments Clause could reinvigorate existing resistance to such appointments. The Supreme Court has never reached this issue, but at least one
former Justice has hinted at his displeasure with the recess appointments of
Article III judges.36 The Constitution states that the President shall appoint
“Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Oﬃcers of the United States”
through Senate conﬁrmation,37 but may also “ﬁll up all Vacancies” through
recess appointments.38 This clear statement is bolstered by the reality that
Presidents from Washington onward have made more than 300 recess
appointments to Article III courts.39 Still, dissenting judges40 and a spirited
group of commentators41 allege that the practice conﬂicts with the guarantee
of judicial independence found in Article III. 42 At least some anecdotal
evidence suggests that Article III judges who reach the bench through recess
appointments occasionally feel political pressure during either their recess
appointments or subsequent conﬁrmation proceedings.43
35
36

See, e.g., Evans, 387 F.3d at 1222; Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1009-10; Allocco, 305 F.2d at 708-09.
See Evans v. Stephens, 544 U.S. 942, 942-43 (2005) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of
certiorari) (noting the “signiﬁcant constitutional questions regarding the President’s intrasession
appointment of Judge William H. Pryor, Jr.,” and stating that “it would be a mistake to assume
that our disposition of this petition constitutes a decision on the merits of whether the President
has the constitutional authority to ﬁll future Article III vacancies”).
37 U.S. C ONST . art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
38 U.S. C ONST . art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
39 See Herz, supra note 19, at 448-49. Professor Herz calls the textual case for judicial recess
appointments “awfully clear,” especially when “matched by a consistent practice” reaching back to
Washington. Id.
40 See Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1033 (Norris, J., dissenting) (“The fundamental principle of separation of powers must prevail over a peripheral concern for governmental eﬃciency, and core
constitutional values must prevail over uncritical acceptance of historical practice.”).
41 See, e.g., Blake Denton, While the Senate Sleeps: Do Contemporary Events Warrant a New
Interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause?, 58 C ATH. U. L. R EV. 751, 757 (2009) (using a
dynamic view of the Constitution to argue that Article III judges should not receive recess
appointments because of changed realities in the federal judiciary); William Ty Mayton, Recess
Appointments and an Independent Judiciary, 20 C ONST. C OMMENT. 515, 518 (2004) (arguing that
the power of the executive to make recess appointments should by trumped by the right of
litigants to be free from judges who may not be truly independent).
42 See U.S. C ONST . art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall
hold their Oﬃces during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Oﬃce.”).
43 See, e.g., Nomination of William J. Brennan, Jr., to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong. (1957), available at
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Some commentators believe it may be technically constitutional but unwise
to read the Recess Appointments Clause broadly.44 Others argue that the
clause provides a much needed safety valve against government gridlock,
especially in light of Senators’ frequent threats to ﬁlibuster Presidential
nominees.45 The relative lack of case law addressing these questions has also
prompted some fairly creative interpretations of the clause and imaginative
suggestions as to how it can be manipulated.46
The courts that had addressed these questions, however, had consistently
determined that the recess appointment power could be used to ﬁll vacancies during both intrasession and intersession recesses, to ﬁll vacancies that
existed prior to the start of the recess in which the appointment was made,
and to ﬁll vacancies on Article III courts. In a dramatic departure from the
decisions of those courts—with respect to the two most controversial
issues—the Noel Canning court held the opposite.
II. T HE C ASE: N OEL CANNING V. NLRB
Chief Judge Sentelle, writing for the majority, acknowledged the surprising outcome of the case when he wrote, “[w]hile the posture of the
petition is routine, as it developed, our review is not.”47 The case may have
http://www.princeton.edu/aci/cases-pdf/aci3.brennanhearings.pdf (detailing the diﬃcult questions
about communism that recess appointee Justice Brennan received from Senator Joseph McCarthy
during his conﬁrmation hearings); JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 164 (1981) (noting that 1960s recess
appointees to the Fifth Circuit avoided race-related cases until they were conﬁrmed by the Senate).
44 See, e.g., Diana Gribbon Motz, The Constitutionality and Advisability of Recess Appointments of
Article III Judges, 97 V A. L. R EV. 1665, 1676 (2011) (“The constitutionality of recess appointments
of Article III judges does not, however, render them wise.”); Note, Recess Appointments to the
Supreme Court—Constitutional but Unwise?, 10 STAN. L. R EV. 124, 146-47 (1957) (arguing that
recess appointments to the Supreme Court are constitutional, but that the President should make
them “only in cases of clearest emergency”).
45 See, e.g., Alexander I. Platt, Note, Preserving the Appointments Safety Valve, 30 Y ALE L. &
P OL'Y R EV. 255, 288 (2011) (arguing for an expansive reading of the recess appointment power to
combat the existing paralysis in Senate advice and consent).
46 See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, Can the President Appoint Principal Executive Oﬃcers
Without a Senate Conﬁrmation Vote?, 122 Y ALE L.J. 940, 946 (2013) (making the novel argument
that if the Senate fails to act on an important executive branch nomination—never actually voting
the nominee up or down—it consents to that nominee taking oﬃce); Seth Barrett Tillman, Senate
Termination of Presidential Recess Appointments, 101 N W. U. L. R EV. C OLLOQUY 82, 83 & n.8
(2007) (proposing a mechanism by which a Senate that wanted to curtail a recess appointee’s time
in oﬃce could simply “convene, immediately terminate its session, and then reconvene instantly”).
But see Brian C. Kalt, Keeping Recess Appointments in Their Place, 101 N W. U. L. R EV. C OLLOQUY
88, 89-92 (2007) (suggesting that Tillman’s proposal would be inconsistent with the spirit of the
Constitution and easily circumvented by the President).
47 Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 493 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013).
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originated as a standard labor dispute, but it ultimately came to encompass a
deeply divisive political quarrel over unanswered questions of executive
power. If the outcome of Noel Canning stands, it will signiﬁcantly narrow
the President’s power to appoint oﬃcers.
A. Controversy Caused by President Obama’s
January 14, 2012 Recess Appointments
Every President has used recess appointments to ﬁll oﬃcial vacancies
over the past few decades, but President Obama has exercised the power far
less frequently than his predecessors. Over the course of his time in oﬃce,
President Reagan invoked the recess appointment power 232 times; President
George H. W. Bush, 78 times; President Clinton, 139 times; President
George W. Bush, 171 times; and President Obama, just 32 times. 48 The
magnitude of the controversies surrounding these appointments has depended
on the positions being ﬁlled and the partisan balance of the political branches
at the time of appointment. Presidents as diverse as Reagan, George H. W.
Bush, and Obama have jealously defended their constitutional right to make
these appointments.49
Recently, the President’s ability to make recess appointments has been
complicated by Congress’s use of pro forma sessions. During these sessions,
one member enters the chamber to formally gavel in the day’s session, but
no actual legislative work is done.50 Pro forma sessions previously had been
used to satisfy the formal requirements of the Adjournments Clause,51 but
were ﬁrst used to prevent recess appointments in 2007, when Senate

48
49

See Hogue Memo, supra note 10, at 4 tbl.1.
See, e.g., Lawfulness of Recess Appointments During a Recess of the Senate Notwithstanding Periodic Pro Forma Sessions, 36 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 OLC Memo],
available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2012/pro-forma-sessions-opinion.pdf (asserting the President’s
right to ignore pro forma sessions in the Senate and make recess appointments); Statement on
Signing the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 2 P UB. P APERS 1962, 1963 (Oct. 24, 1992) (arguing that
amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 “must be interpreted so as not to interfere with
[the President’s] authority under Article II, section 2 of the Constitution to make recess appointments”); Statement on Signing the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary,
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1985, 2 PUB. P APERS 1210, 1211 (Aug. 30, 1984)
(explaining that pending legislation designed to restrict the authority of recess appointees would
raise “troubling constitutional issues with respect to my recess appointments power”).
50 For a brief explanation of the evolution of pro forma sessions in this context, see Jeﬀ
VanDam, Comment, The Kill Switch: The New Battle over Presidential Recess Appointments, 107 N W.
U. L. R EV. 361, 374-78 (2012).
51 See U.S. C ONST . art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (“Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall,
without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days . . . .”).
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Democrats became angered by President Bush’s use of the power.52 President
Bush accepted the Democratic Senate’s continued use of this tactic and was
prevented from making a single additional recess appointment for the
remainder of his term.53
During the early years of the ﬁrst Obama Administration, the Democratic Senate avoided pro forma sessions. In 2010, however, Democrats
decided to hold pro forma sessions that they believed would preclude recess
appointments, but would also prevent Senate Republicans from rejecting
nominees President Obama had already named.54 Eventually, Republicans
in the House of Representatives began holding their own pro forma sessions,55 which forced the Senate to follow suit due to the formal requirements of the Adjournments Clause.
This state of aﬀairs continued through the end of 2011. On December 17,
2011, the Senate adopted a unanimous consent agreement that “no business”
would be conducted until January 23, 2012, but that pro forma sessions
would be scheduled every three days, including on January 3, 2012.56 On
January 4, 2012, President Obama ignored the pro forma sessions and made
four recess appointments, including three to the NLRB, which are at issue
in Noel Canning.57 The President also released an opinion from the Oﬃce of
Legal Counsel justifying his decision.58 Just eleven months later, President
Obama’s decision to make the appointments came before the D.C. Circuit
for constitutional review.

52 See Erin P. Billings, Reid to Keep Senate in Session to Prevent Recess Appointments, R OLL
C ALL (Nov. 16, 2007), http://www.rollcall.com/news/-21044-1.html (“Senate Majority Leader
Harry Reid . . . has decided to keep the chamber in session over the Thanksgiving break to block
President Bush from making any unsavory recess appointments while Senators are out of town.”).
53 See Hogue Memo, supra note 10, at 21-27 tbls.8 & 9 (demonstrating that President Bush
made no recess appointments—intersession or intrasession—after April 2007).
54 David M. Herszenhorn, A Rush to Legislate, and to Maneuver, N.Y. T IMES (Sept. 30, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/01/us/politics/01cong.html.
55 See Jonathan Allen, Senators Ask John Boehner to Help Block Obama Recess Appointments,
POLITICO (May 25, 2011), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0511/55723.html; Peter Schroeder,
GOP Freshmen: Stop Recess Appointments by Stopping Recess, T HE H ILL (June 13, 2011, 2:47 PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/banking-ﬁnancial-institutions/166097-gopfreshmen-no-obamarecess-appointments (explaining the thinking of House Republicans in preventing Congressional recesses).
56 157 C ONG . R EC . S8783-84 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2011). The Senate’s January 3, 2012 session
was constitutionally mandated. See U.S. C ONST. amend. XX, § 2 (“The Congress shall assemble
at least once in every year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless
they shall by law appoint a diﬀerent day.”).
57 See Recess Appointment Press Release, supra note 1.
58 See 2012 OLC Memo, supra note 49.
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B. Factual and Procedural Background
The disagreement at the core of the case arose from a labor dispute between
Noel Canning, a Pepsi-Cola bottler and distributor, and the local Teamsters
union.59 The union claimed Noel Canning engaged in unfair labor practices
and violated federal law when it refused to execute a verbally agreed-upon
collective bargaining agreement. 60 The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
agreed and ruled for the union.61 On February 8, 2012, little more than a
month after the President’s recess appointments of the three new NLRB
members, the NLRB aﬃrmed the decision of the ALJ. 62 Noel Canning
petitioned for review in the D.C. Circuit and the NLRB cross-petitioned to
guarantee enforcement of its order.63 Before the D.C. Circuit, Noel Canning
stated its constitutional objections to the recess appointments of three of
the NLRB’s members. Because the Supreme Court has held that the NLRB
must have a quorum of three of its ﬁve members to issue valid decisions, a
successful challenge to the three recess appointments would invalidate the
NLRB’s ruling.64
C. Opinion of the D.C. Circuit
Chief Judge Sentelle, writing for the court, ﬁrst had to perform a “routine review” of the two statutory claims raised by the Noel Canning company.65
The court rejected Noel Canning’s claim that the NLRB’s factual ﬁnding of
an agreement between the union and the company was not supported by
substantial evidence, citing the deference owed to an ALJ on questions of
creditability.66 The court also refused to consider Noel Canning’s argument
that the ALJ erred by declining to apply Washington state law to determine
59 See Noel Canning, a Div. of the Noel Corp., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 4, at 3 (Feb. 8, 2012), vacated,
Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013).
60 Id. The union claimed Noel Canning violated section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA). See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5) (2006) (declaring that it is an unfair labor
practice to, among other things, “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of ”
their statutory rights or “to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of ” the employees).
61 Noel Canning, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 4 at 8.
62 Id. at 1.
63 Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 492.
64 See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2644 (2010) (holding that the
NLRB could not exercise its authority once its membership had fallen to two and noting, “we ﬁnd
that the Board quorum requirement and the three-member delegation clause should not be read as
easily surmounted technical obstacles of little to no import”).
65 See Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 493 (noting that courts must avoid deciding a constitutional
question “if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of ”
(quoting Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring))).
66 See id. at 493-96.
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whether the contract could be enforced.67 Because the company had not
raised this issue as an exception before the NLRB, the court found that it
lacked jurisdiction “to hear any ‘objection that has not been urged before the
Board.’”68 After ﬁnding that the case could not be resolved on either of the
statutory points, Chief Judge Sentelle turned to the constitutional questions.
Noel Canning had not raised its constitutional claims before the NLRB
either, however. Normally this defect would have deprived the court of
jurisdiction, but it found that the company’s failure to raise the constitutional claims fell within the exception for “extraordinary circumstances”
provided by section 10(e) of the NLRA. 69 The court noted the “serious
argument” against its jurisdiction, 70 but reasoned that the constitutional
claims “raise questions that go to the very power of the Board to act and
implicate fundamental separation of powers concerns.”71 The opinion cites
Supreme Court dicta to support its argument that “‘if the Board has
patently traveled outside the orbit of its authority so that there is, legally
speaking, no order to enforce,’ a reviewing court can not enter an order of
enforcement.” 72 If there is no quorum, the NLRB’s orbit of authority
shrinks to nothing and any act is beyond its proper scope.
After establishing that it had jurisdiction, the court reached the core of
the case. The court chose to answer two constitutional questions. First, for
the purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause, what does “the Recess”
mean? Second, does the clause mean that the President can ﬁll vacancies
that “happen to exist” during the recess or only those that “happen to arise”
during this period?
1. The Meaning of “the Recess”
First, the court considered the language and structure of the Recess
Appointments Clause to determine whether “the Recess” allows appointments during intrasession recesses or only during intersession breaks.
The court began its analysis of this issue by noting the “diﬀerence between
the word choice ‘recess’ and ‘the Recess,’”73 the latter having been selected
by the Framers. The court found this “not an insigniﬁcant distinction”
67
68
69

Id. at 496.
Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (2006)).
See id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), which notes that the failure to raise an objection before
the Board may “be excused because of extraordinary circumstances”).
70 Id.
71 Id. at 497.
72 Id. (quoting NLRB v. Cheney Cal. Lumber Co., 327 U.S. 385, 388 (1946)).
73 Id. at 500.
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because the use of a deﬁnite article suggests that the Constitution is referring
to “‘a particular thing.’”74 The court was careful to use contemporaneous
dictionaries to reach this conclusion, because it believed proper constitutional interpretation “must look to the natural meaning of the text as it
would have been understood at the time of the ratiﬁcation.”75
The court then drew a distinction between the Constitution’s use of the
terms “adjourn” or “adjournment”—meaning a break in congressional proceedings generally—and the more selective use of “the Recess”—meaning something special and speciﬁc, more than a simple adjournment.76 This distinction is
further emphasized by the court’s next point. It argued that the clause’s
statement that recess appointments expire “at the End of [the Senate’s] next
Session” implies a structural dichotomy.77 Either the Senate is in “the Recess”
or it is in “Session,” suggesting that intrasession breaks, no matter how long, fall
outside the meaning of the clause. Here the court provided contemporaneous
support in the form of a bill from the First Congress that set pay for a clerk at
“two dollars per day during the session, with the like compensation . . . while
he shall be necessarily employed in the recess.”78
After ﬁnding that the language and structure of the clause suggest a speciﬁc, narrow reading of “the Recess,” the court turned to Founding-era
history. Few sources are directly on point, but the court pointed to Alexander
Hamilton’s statement in the Federalist Papers that recess appointments
terminate “at the end of the ensuing session.”79 In the court’s view, “[f ] or
there to be an ‘ensuing session,’ it seems likely to the point of near certainty
that recess appointments were being made at a time when the Senate was
not in session.”80 Because of the scarcity of Founding-era writings on the
meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, the court examined interpretations of similar state constitutional provisions.81 The court argued that the

74 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 2 S AMUEL J OHNSON , A D ICTIONARY OF THE
E NGLISH L ANGUAGE 2041 (1755)).
75 Id. (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788 (2008)).
76 Id. In addition to the Recess Appointments Clause, “the Recess” appears in only one other
place—the Senate Vacancies Clause. See U.S. C ONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2, amended by U.S. C ONST.
amend. XVII.
77 Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 500 (quoting U.S. C ONST . art. II, § 2, cl. 3).
78 Id. (quoting Act of Sept. 22, 1789, ch. 17, § 4, 1 Stat. 70, 71).
79 Id. (quoting T HE F EDERALIST N O . 67, at 408 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 2003)).
80 Id. at 500-01.
81 For the court’s justiﬁcation of this interpretive approach, see District of Columbia v. Heller,
��� S. Ct. ����, ���� (����), in which the Supreme Court conﬁrmed its interpretation of the
Second Amendment through a review of “analogous arms-bearing rights in state constitutions,”
and Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 (1990), where the Court observed that “[s]everal early
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North Carolina Constitution is similar in language and structure,82 and that
an 1819 decision from the North Carolina Supreme Court “implies that the
provision was seen as diﬀerentiating between ‘the session of the General
Assembly’ and ‘the recess of the General Assembly.’”83 Notably, however,
that case did not attempt to deﬁne the meaning of “recess”; instead it
addressed the question of whether the governor could ﬁll a position if the
vacancy arose while the state’s general assembly was in session.84
Although the NLRB framed its arguments in light of presidents’ frequent use of recess appointments, both intrasession and intersession, the
court maintained that “the historical role of the Recess Appointments
Clause is neither clear nor consistent.” 85 By focusing its analysis on the
practice and interpretation “in the years immediately following the Constitution’s ratiﬁcation,”86 the court was able to disregard the proliﬁc use of
both intrasession and intersession recess appointments in more recent
times. The court noted that the ﬁrst intrasession appointment was not made
until 1867,87 and that only three such appointments were made before 1947.88
The fact that the executive rarely ﬁlled vacancies during intrasession recesses
“‘suggests an assumed absence of [the] power’ to make such appointments.”89
The court drew on INS v. Chadha90 to strengthen its refusal to consider
the behavior of recent administrations.91 While invalidating the use of the
State Constitutions . . . appear to have been a basis for the Framers’ understanding of the [Ex
Post Facto Clause].”
82 See Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 501. To support this claim, the court cites Thomas A. Curtis,
Note, Recess Appointments to Article III Courts: The Use of Historical Practice in Constitutional
Interpretation, 84 C OLUM. L. R EV. 1758, 1770-72 (1984), which argues that a provision of the
North Carolina Constitution served as the model for the Recess Appointments Clause.
83 Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 501 (quoting Beard v. Cameron, 7 N.C. (3 Mur.) 181, 184-85
(1819) (opinion of Taylor, C.J.)).
84 See Beard, 7 N.C. (3 Mur.) at 181. Notably, the North Carolina Constitution did not use a
deﬁnite article before “recess.” See N.C. C ONST. of 1776, art. XX (giving the governor recess
appointment power “in every case where any oﬃcer, the right of whose appointment is by this
Constitution vested in the General Assembly, shall, during their recess, die, or his oﬃce by other
means become vacant”), reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND D OCUMENTS OF U NITED S TATES
C ONSTITUTIONS 406 (William F. Swindler ed., 1978).
85 Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 501.
86 Id.
87 Id. (citing Hartnett, supra note 24, at 408-09).
88 Id. at 502 (citing Carrier, supra note 27, at 2209-12, 2235). Of course, the lack of intrasession recess appointments may simply be the result of the rarity of intrasession recesses in the early
years of the Republic. See Rappaport, supra note 27, at 1565 (“[Before the Civil War,] Congress rarely
took an intrasession recess, doing so only in 1800, 1817, and 1828, each time for at most one week.”).
89 Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 502 (alteration in original) (quoting Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 908 (1997)).
90 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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one-house veto, the Chadha Court said, “our inquiry is sharpened rather
than blunted by the fact that congressional veto provisions are appearing
with increasing frequency.”92 The court in Noel Canning framed its conclusion in the same way—historical acquiescence to an unconstitutional
practice does not make the practice permissible.93
Next, the court attempted to situate the Recess Appointments Clause in
its broader view of the proper separation of powers, calling recess appointments a “stopgap.”94 This characterization is based on Hamilton’s explanation that Senate conﬁrmation “declares the general mode of appointing
oﬃcers of the United States,” while recess appointments are “nothing more
than a supplement” or an “auxiliary method.”95 This stopgap method was
necessary when intersession recesses “were regularly six to nine months.” 96
Allowing the auxiliary path to swallow the general process would violate the
“careful separation of powers structure reﬂected in the Appointments
Clause.”97 The opinion points to the Supreme Court’s observation that the
“manipulation of oﬃcial appointments had long been one of the American
revolutionary generation’s greatest grievances against executive power” to
support its separation-of-powers argument that the Recess Appointments
Clause should be read narrowly to apply to intersession recesses only.98
The court then considered and rejected four alternative explanations for
what “the Recess” might mean. The ﬁrst, that recess appointments are
constitutionally permitted during any break of the Senate, even for the
weekend or for lunch, was rejected out of hand because it would turn the
normal process “upside down.”99 The court also rejected a second alternative
which would allow recess appointments during any “substantial passage of
time, such as a ten- or twenty-day break” 100 because that deﬁnition is

91
92

See Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 502.
��� U.S. at ���. The Ninth Circuit also considered the eﬀect of Chadha when it analyzed
the use of intrasession recess appointments, but tempered Chadha’s eﬀect with the Supreme
Court’s contemporaneous decision Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), in which the Court
used longstanding history as a guide to the Constitution’s meaning. See United States v. Woodley,
751 F.2d 1008, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792). But see id. at 1024-26
(Norris, J., dissenting) (taking issue with the majority’s treatment of Chadha and Marsh).
93 See Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 502.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 502-03 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, supra note 79, at 408).
96 Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 503 (citing Rappaport, supra note 27, at 1498).
97 Id.
98 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 883 (1991)).
99 Id.
100 Id. at 503-04. The court attributes this deﬁnition of an acceptable recess to former Attorney
General Harry M. Daugherty. See Exec. Power—Recess Appointments, 33 Op. Att’y Gen. 20, 22 (1921).
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“ﬂimsy”101 and fails to “establish[ ] high walls and clear distinctions,” which
are necessary to police “the heat of interbranch conﬂict.”102 Third, the court
rejected an approach that links an appropriate recess to “any adjournment of
more than three days pursuant to the Adjournments Clause,”103 because the
two clauses “exist in diﬀerent contexts and contain no hint that they should
be read together.”104 Finally, the court rejected the “functional interpretation in which the President has discretion” to determine when an appropriate
recess exists, because it would “demolish the checks and balances inherent in
the advice-and-consent requirement.”105
The court put a ﬁnal punctuation mark on this portion of its analysis by
reminding the other branches of government that “[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”106 The
court has decided that the original language and purpose of the Recess
Appointments Clause do not allow for appointments during intrasession
recesses, and no amount of executive practice or congressional acquiescence
can alter that meaning.
2. The Meaning of “Happen”
It is absolutely clear that President Obama’s January 4, 2012 recess appointments to the NLRB occurred during an intrasession recess, so the court
could have resolved the dispute and ended the case here.107 The majority
acknowledged that its “holding on the ﬁrst constitutional argument . . . is
suﬃcient to compel a decision vacating the Board’s order,” but addressed
the second question, nonetheless.108

101
102
103

Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 504.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995)).
Id. (citing U.S. C ONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (“Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days . . . .”)).
104 Id.
105 Id. The Court attributes the proposed functional interpretation to the 2012 OLC memo
that President Obama relied on to make the recess appointments at question in this case. See 2012
OLC Memo, supra note 49, at 13 (“[W]e conclude that the President may determine that pro
forma sessions at which no business is to be conducted do not interrupt a Senate recess for
purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause.”).
106 Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 506 (alteration in original) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). The court also cited Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952), for the proposition that “the courts must make the same determination [as to the
operation of conﬂicting laws] if the executive has acted contrary to the Constitution.” Noel
Canning, 705 F.3d at 506.
107 This concern was raised by Judge Griﬃth in his concurring opinion. See infra Part II.D.
108 Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 507.
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The NLRB argued that “Vacancies that may happen during the Recess”109
encompass vacancies that “happen to exist” during the Recess, while Noel
Canning urged the court to read the clause as referring to vacancies that
“arise,” “begin,” or “come into being” during the Recess.110 The majority
sided with the company.
As with the ﬁrst issue, the court’s analysis began with a consideration of
the “natural meaning of the text as it would have been understood at the
time of the ratiﬁcation.” 111 The court ﬁrst reasoned that interpreting
“happen” to mean “happen to exist” would make the entire phrase inoperative and superﬂuous; had that meaning been intended, the Recess Appointments Clause could have been simpliﬁed to allow the ﬁlling of Vacancies
during the Recess. 112 The court noted the well-established principle that
“every phrase of the Constitution must be given eﬀect.”113
The court then looked to dictionaries from the era of the Founders to
support its interpretation.114 It found support in one deﬁnition of “happen”
as “[t]o fall out; to chance; to come to pass.”115 This deﬁnition suggests an
action actively occurring, which led the court to conclude that only vacancies
that arise during the recess can validly be ﬁlled through recess appointments.
Next, the court restated its structural separation-of-powers argument. If
the President can ﬁll any existing vacancy, he or she can simply wait for the
Senate to recess (whatever meaning that term is given) and short-circuit
“the primary method of appointment,” that is, “the cumbersome advice and
consent procedure.”116
The Constitution contains another use of the term “happen.” Before
Senators were directly elected by voters, the Senate Vacancies Clause read,
“and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of
the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary

109
110
111
112
113
114

U.S. C ONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
See Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 507 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788 (2008)).
Id.
Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803)).
See id. The court cites Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1230 & n.4 (11th Cir. 2004) (en
banc) (Barkett, J., dissenting), with approval of the dissenting judge’s examination of contemporaneous dictionaries. For an argument in favor of the use of dictionaries in statutory interpretation,
see ANTONIN S CALIA & B RYAN A. G ARNER, R EADING L AW: T HE INTERPRETATION OF
L EGAL T EXTS 415-24 (2012). But see Samuel A. Thumma & Jeﬀrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon
Has Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court's Use of Dictionaries, 47 B UFF. L. R EV. 227,
264-276 (1999) (critiquing certain judicial methods of using dictionaries).
115 Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 507 (alteration in original) (quoting 1 J OHNSON , supra note 74,
at 965).
116 Id. at 508.
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Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then
ﬁll such Vacancies.”117
The court reasoned that this clause is only intelligible if “happen” means
“arise.” 118 Because similar terms in the Constitution should be treated
consistently whenever possible, “happen” must also mean “arise” for the
purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause.”119
Here, the court was able to draw support for its interpretation from contemporaneous explanations of the clause. The court pointed to Edmund
Randolph,120 who addressed this question as early as 1792, while serving as
the ﬁrst U.S. Attorney General.121 Randolph rejected the “exist” reading,
asking of a potential recess appointment: “But is it a vacancy which has
happened during the recess of the Senate? It is now the same and no other
vacancy, than that, which existed on the 2nd. of April 1792. It commenced
therefore on that day or may be said to have happened on that day.”122 As the
court noted,123 Hamilton seemed to reach a similar conclusion, writing, “[i]t is
clear, that independent of authority of a special law, the President cannot ﬁll a
vacancy which happens during a session of the Senate.”124
The court quite honestly admitted that several other circuits had rejected
the “arise” interpretation in favor of one that would allow the President to
ﬁll vacancies that happen to “exist.”125 The court discounted those decisions
for a number of reasons. First, at least one of those courts had used a
contemporary dictionary to determine the meaning of “happen,” which is
anathema to the D.C. Circuit’s originalist perspective. 126 The court also
relied on a recent historical study to counter the Eleventh Circuit’s ﬁnding
that Presidents Washington and Jeﬀerson both made appointments to

117
118
119
120
121

U.S. C ONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2, amended by U.S. C ONST. amend. XVII.
Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 508.
Id. (citing Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 587 (1949)).
Id. at 508-09.
See Edmund Randolph, Opinion on Recess Appointments (July 7, 1792), in 24 THE PAPERS
OF T HOMAS J EFFERSON 165, 165-67 (John Catanzariti et al. eds., 1990).
122 Id. at 166.
123 See Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 509.
124 Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry (May 3, 1799), in 23 T HE P APERS
OF A LEXANDER H AMILTON 94, 94 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1976).
125 Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 509 (citing Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1226-27 (11th Cir.
2004) (en banc); United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc); and
United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 709-15 (2d Cir. 1962)).
126 See id. at 509 (criticizing Evans).
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vacancies that did not arise during the relevant recess.127 Next, the court
criticized the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits for their consideration
of a federal statute that permits payment to certain recess appointees who
have ﬁlled vacancies that arose while the Senate was in session.128 Those
circuits treated the statute as an example of congressional acquiescence to
recess appointments ﬁlling existing vacancies, but Noel Canning rejected
that argument because the statute is too recent and an older version of the
same statute entirely forbade payments to that type of appointee.129 The
court characterized this older statute as Congress’s attempt to use the power
of the purse to curb a practice it found improper or unconstitutional.130
The majority opinion in Noel Canning is most forceful when it returns to
its separation-of-powers argument. If the Constitution does not allow the
ﬁlling of vacancies that arise sometime other than during the recess,
“‘[n]either Congress nor the Executive can agree to waive . . . structural
protection[s]’ in the Appointments Clause.”131 In the court’s view, constitutional boundaries are not aﬀected by prior practice, especially because
“structural provisions serve to protect the people.”132 Allowing the President to
fill vacancies that only “exist” threatens this structure and, according to the
court, could therefore threaten the people through executive aggrandizement.
The court admitted that its decision may lead to ineﬃciency,133 but it
clearly prioritized its originalist view of the Recess Appointments Clause by
countering that “[c]onvenience and eﬃciency are not the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government.” 134 And of course,
reasoned the court, if Congress wanted to make the process more eﬃcient,
127 See id. at 509-10 (noting that the Presidents’ practice was to appoint an individual without
his consent, making a recess appointment if the individual turned down the appointment during
the recess (citing Rappaport, supra note 27, at 1522 n.97)).
128 See id. at 510 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 5503 (2006)).
129 See id. The current statutory language of § 5503 became law in 1966. Act of Sept. 6, 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378, 475. Chief Judge Sentelle pointed to an earlier iteration of the
statute which forbid payment

as salary, to any person appointed during the recess of the Senate, to ﬁll a vacancy in
any existing oﬃce, which vacancy existed while the Senate was in session and is by
law required to be ﬁlled by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, until such
appointee shall have been conﬁrmed by the Senate.
Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 510 (quoting Act of Feb. 9, 1863, ch. 25, § 2, 12 Stat. 642, 646).
130 See Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 510.
131 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 880 (1991)).
132 Id.
133 See id. at 511 (“Our sister circuits and the Board contend that the ‘arise’ interpretation
fosters ineﬃciencies and leaves open the possibility of just what is occurring here—that is, a Board
that cannot act . . . .”).
134 Id. (alternation in original) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)).
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it could provide for acting members on the NLRB 135 or allow exiting
members to continue serving until a replacement is properly appointed.136
The court’s decision appears to be driven by its choice to treat the separation of powers—as it believes the Founders understood that concept—as
the ultimate touchstone. The fact that the court’s holding on this second
constitutional question, when paired with its holding on the ﬁrst, threatens
to completely obliterate recess appointments does not matter. The values of
pragmatism and eﬃciency are dramatically lesser concerns. Because the court
held that the Recess Appointments Clause only allows the President to ﬁll
vacancies that “happen to arise” during the recess, each of President Obama’s
three appointments to the NLRB was invalidated on a second ground.137
D. Judge Griﬃth’s Concurrence
Judge Griﬃth ﬁled a short, but important concurrence in the case.138
Although he concurred in the judgment and agreed with the majority
opinion’s rejection of intrasession recess appointments, Judge Griﬃth
would not have reached the issue of when vacancies must “happen.” He
pointed out that the majority “acknowledges that our holding on intrasession recess appointments is suﬃcient to vacate the Board’s order”139 and
135 See id. (pointing to a number of examples where Congress has permitted an acting agency
head (citing 10 U.S.C. § 132(b) (2006) (Secretary of Defense); id. § 154(d), (e) (Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staﬀ); �� U.S.C. § ��� (����) (Attorney General); �� U.S.C. § ��� (2006) (Secretary of
Labor); 50 U.S.C. § 403-3a(a) (2006) (Director of National Intelligence); and id. § 403-4c(b)(2)
(Supp. IV 2011) (Director of the Central Intelligence Agency))).
136 See id. (noting several instances in which Congress has permitted this mechanism (citing
7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2)(A) (2006) (Commodity Futures Trading Commission); 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a)
(2006) (Securities and Exchange Commission); 42 U.S.C. § 7171(b)(1) (2006) (Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission); and 47 U.S.C. § 154(c) (2006) (Federal Communications Commission))).
137 The court went on to apply its newly created deﬁnition of “happen” to each of the three
NLRB appointees. Two had ﬁlled vacancies created during intrasession recesses several months
before the recess during which they were appointed. See id. at 512 (citing U.S. G OV’T P RINTING
O FFICE, O FFICIAL C ONGRESSIONAL D IRECTORY, 112TH C ONGRESS 538 (2011)). The
vacancy ﬁlled by the third appointee is more complicated. That individual ﬁlled a vacancy created
by the expiration of a separate, earlier recess appointment. See id. at 498, 512. The Senate
“declined to adjourn sine die[, oﬃcially ending the session],” so the First Session of the ���th
Congress ended at the same time the Second Session began, with no intersession recess. Id. at 513.
The court was therefore forced to engage in logical gymnastics to argue that “the Clause states
that a recess appointment expires ‘at the End of [the Senate's] next Session,’ not ‘at the beginning
of the Senate's next Recess’” to reach the conclusion that the vacancy did not arise during a recess.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. C ONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3). Whether the Founding
Fathers would have acknowledged this ﬁne distinction is unclear.
138 Id. at ��� (Griﬃth, J., concurring).
139 Id.
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argued, “[i]f we need not take up a constitutional issue, we should not.”140
Although Judge Griﬃth found the government’s position that the President
could ﬁll vacancies that “happen to exist” during a recess “suspect,” he noted
that the practice traces back to the 1820s and the judiciary “should not dismiss
another branch’s longstanding interpretation of the Constitution when the case
before us does not demand it.”141 If the Supreme Court wants to limit the
President’s power to grant recess appointments without completely neutering
the clause, Judge Griﬃth’s concurrence provides one path to that result.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE D ECISION
The impact of Noel Canning is signiﬁcant, but its ultimate reach is unclear.
The Supreme Court’s reasoning could soon supplant the D.C. Circuit’s
decision. Although the opinion only binds cases in the D.C. Circuit, the
organic statutes of a number of federal agencies, notably the NLRB, create
rights of appeal to that court.142 The decision has drawn particular attention
because it appears to undermine the authority of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) by invalidating the appointment of the agency’s
ﬁrst Director, Richard Cordray,143 who was appointed the same day as the
NLRB members involved in Noel Canning.144 Senators eventually reached
an agreement to conﬁrm Cordray 145 and members of the NLRB 146 in

140 Id. (citing Elk Grove Uniﬁed Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004); Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660-61 (1981); and Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S.
288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
141 Id.
142 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 160(f ) (2006) (granting “[a]ny person aggrieved by a ﬁnal order of
the [NLRB]” the right to appeal that order to the D.C. Circuit).
143 See Savage & Greenhouse, supra note 14 (“The decision also casts a cloud over Mr.
Cordray’s appointment.”).
144 See Recess Appointment Press Release, supra note 1.
145 See Danielle Douglas, Senate Confirms Cordray to Head Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
WASH. POST ( J uly 16, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-07-16/business/40608755_1_
senate-republicans-consumer-ﬁnancial-protection-bureau-richard-cordray.
146 See Michael A. Memoli, Senate Conﬁrms Obama Choices for National Labor Relations Board,
L.A. T IMES ( J uly 30, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-na-pn-nlrb-senate-votes��������,�,�������.story (noting the conﬁrmation of nominees Kent Hirozawa and Nancy
Schiﬀer). None of the three recess appointees that ﬁgured in Noel Canning remain on the Board,
however: the White House withdrew the nominations of Richard Griﬃn and Sharon Block, while
Terence Flynn, the President’s third NLRB recess appointee, resigned in May 2012. See Steven
Greenhouse, Labor Board Member Resigns Over Leak to G.O.P. Allies, N.Y. T IMES (May 27, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/28/business/gop-labor-board-member-terence-ﬂynn-quits-overleak.html; Josh Hicks, How Obama’s NLRB Nominees Became Central to Senate Filibuster Debate,
W ASH. P OST ( J uly 17, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2013/07/17/
how-obamas-nlrb-nominees-became-central-to-the-senates-ﬁlibuster-deal.
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exchange for leaving the ﬁlibuster rules in place. 147 These conﬁrmations
ended a political crisis, but legal questions about the preconﬁrmation acts of
the CFPB and NLRB must be resolved by the Supreme Court or in
subsequent litigation.
A. Impact on the NLRB
The day Noel Canning was decided, the NLRB issued a deﬁant statement
“respectfully disagree[ing]” with the ruling and promising to “continue to
perform our statutory duties and issue decisions.” 148 White House Press
Secretary Jay Carney echoed the NLRB’s sentiment, criticized the opinion,
and said, “It’s one court, one case, one company.” 149 Although Carney’s
statement is technically true, it dramatically understates the potential
ramiﬁcations for NLRB actions if Noel Canning remains the law.
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) grants aggrieved parties a
right to appeal all decisions of the NLRB to the D.C. Circuit.150 Because
future panels of the D.C. Circuit will be bound by the legal reasoning of the
Noel Canning court, 151 all NLRB actions that took place after the recess
appointments in January 2012 and before the Senate conﬁrmed NLRB
members in July are vulnerable to litigation. Companies across the country
have relied on Noel Canning to challenge or ignore the NLRB.152 The clear
circuit split created by the D.C. Circuit’s decision also provides strong
incentives for forum shopping.153 The NLRA allows parties to appeal either
to the D.C. Circuit or to any “circuit wherein the unfair labor practice in
147
148

See Memoli, supra note 146.
Press Release, Mark Gaston Pearce, Chairman, NLRB, Statement on Recess Appointment Ruling (Jan. 25, 2013), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-releases/statementchairman-pearce-recess-appointment-ruling.
149 Donovan Slack, White House Blasts Recess Appointments Ruling, P OLITICO (Jan. 27, 2013),
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/wh-blasts-recess-appointments-ruling-86737.html.
150 See 29 U.S.C. § 160(f ) .
151 See 16AA C HARLES A LAN W RIGHT ET AL ., F EDERAL P RACTICE AND P ROCEDURE
§ 3981.1 (4th ed. 2008) (“The courts of appeals generally follow a practice that one panel is bound
by the holdings in a prior decision of another panel of that court.”).
152 See Melanie Trottman & Kris Maher, Companies Challenge Labor Rulings, W ALL S T . J.
(Mar. 8, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324034804578346700152526718.html
(noting that since the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, “at least 87 companies and three unions have cited the
decision in cases at varying stages within the agency”).
153 See Joel Barras, Coin Toss May Decide New Appeals of NLRB Decisions, F ORBES (Feb. 25,
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/theemploymentbeat/2013/02/25/coin-toss-may-decide-new-appealsof-nlrb-decisions (“If the circuit courts diﬀer on the validity of the NLRB recess appointees, an
employer’s appeal of an NLRB decision may turn solely on the circuit court that decides the
appeal . . . .”).
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question was alleged to have been engaged in or wherein such person resides
or transacts business,”154 but it also allows the NLRB to seek enforcement of
its decisions in those same courts.155
Both dissatisﬁed parties and the NLRB have strong incentives to forum
shop, which has particularly perverse consequences in this context. When
“proceedings are instituted in two or more courts of appeals with respect to
the same order,”156 there are a number of possible outcomes. The process
favors early ﬁlers,157 but the strangest case occurs when multiple petitions
for review are ﬁled in diﬀerent circuits within ten days of the order. Then,
the agency sends the case to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,
which chooses a circuit “by means of random selection.”158 The decision to
enforce or invalidate an NLRB order could, quite literally, be determined
by the ﬂip of a coin.
A party’s failure to raise the constitutional recess appointments claim in
prior proceedings before an ALJ or the NLRB is unlikely to bar relief. The
Noel Canning company did not raise its challenge to the NLRB’s quorum
until it was before the D.C. Circuit, where the Court held that “failure to
urge the objection before the Board comes within the exception for ‘extraordinary circumstances.’”159
The NLRB may attempt to defend its actions with the de facto oﬃcer
doctrine, which confers legitimacy on actions of oﬃcers acting under
apparent authority, even when it is later discovered that their election or
appointment was improper. 160 But, the Supreme Court has signiﬁcantly
narrowed the reach of that doctrine. In Ryder v. United States,161 the Court
considered a criminal conviction before the Coast Guard Court of Military
Review where the appointment of two of the panel’s judges had failed to
154
155

29 U.S.C. § 160(f).
See id. § 160(e) (“The Board shall have power to petition any court of appeals of the United
States . . . .”).
156 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (2006); see also UAW v. NLRB, 677 F.3d 276, 277 (6th Cir. 2012)
(laying out the § 2112(a) procedure).
157 If only one party ﬁles for appeal within ten days of a decision, the appeal will be heard in
the venue chosen by the ﬁler. See 28 U.S.C § ����(a)(�). If no appeal is ﬁled within ten days, the
ﬁrst party to ﬁle after that point chooses the venue. Id.
158 Id. § 2112(a)(3).
159 Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 496 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861
(2013) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)); see also supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
160 See, e.g., Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 441-42 (1886) (“The doctrine which
gives validity to acts of oﬃcers de facto, whatever defects there may be in the legality of their
appointment or election, is founded upon considerations of policy and necessity . . . . It is
manifest that endless confusion would result if in every proceeding before such oﬃcers their title
could be called in question.”).
161 515 U.S. 177 (1995).
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meet the requirements of the Appointments Clause. The majority held that
the de facto oﬃcer doctrine did not apply because the defendant’s claim “is
based on the Appointments Clause of Article II of the Constitution—a claim
that there has been a ‘trespass upon the executive power of appointment.’”162
Almost immediately after the Noel Canning ruling, at least one hospital
chain based in California announced that it would ignore decisions issued
by the NLRB during the period when three of the Board’s members served
due to recess appointments.163 If Noel Canning remains the law of the land,
all NLRB decisions issued between January 4, 2012 and July 30, 2013 appear
subject to challenge.
B. Impact on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
As soon as Noel Canning was decided, media and critics of the CFPB
questioned the legitimacy of Richard Cordray’s recess appointment. 164
Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell argued that the “decision now
casts serious doubt on whether the President’s ‘recess’ appointment of
Richard Cordray to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau . . . is
constitutional.”165 White House Press Secretary Jay Carney maintained that
the ruling “has no bearing on Richard Cordray,”166 but Cordray, like the
NLRB members, is clearly an “Oﬃcer[] of the United States”167 under the

162
163

Id. at 182 (quoting McDowell v. United States, 159 U.S. 596, 598 (1895)).
See Terry Baynes, Exclusive: Hospital Chain Deﬁes NLRB Rulings After Court Decision,
R EUTERS (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/01/us-nlrb-hospital-idUSBRE
91001320130201.
164 See, e.g., Robert Barnes & Steven Mufson, Court Says Obama Exceeded Authority in Making
Appointments, WASH. POST ( J an. 25, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-01-25/politics/
36541588_1_recess-appointments-richard-cordray-president-obama (“The ruling also raises
questions about the recess appointment of former Ohio attorney general Richard Cordray to head
the ﬂedgling Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and about the actions taken by the agency
during his tenure . . . .”); Press Release, Eric Cantor, Majority Leader, U.S. House of Representatives, Leader Cantor: A Step Closer to Achieving Transparency & Oversight of NLRB & CFPB
(Jan. 25, 2013), available at http://majorityleader.gov/newsroom/2013/01/leader-cantor-a-stepcloser-to-achieving-transparency-oversight-of-nlrb-cfpb.html (asserting that the D.C. Circuit’s
opinion declared President Obama’s appointment of Cordray unconstitutional).
165 Press Release, Mitch McConnell, Minority Leader, U.S. Senate, Court Rules President
Obama’s NLRB ‘Recess’ Appointments Are Unconstitutional (Jan. 25, 2013), available at
http://www.mcconnell.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=ea415ca
6-0919-4f34-95ec-e9d0d812fc20.
166 See Peter Schroeder, McConnell: NLRB Ruling Casts ‘Serious Doubt’ on Cordray Appointment, T HE H ILL (Jan. 25, 2013, 2:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/bankingﬁnancial-institutions/279349-mcconnell-nlrb-ruling-casts-serious-doubt-on-cordray (quoting Carney).
167 U.S. C ONST . art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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Constitution, and there is no obvious reason why Noel Canning’s logic would
not apply to his appointment.
The CFPB was created by Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.168 Congress fashioned the CFPB to
“regulate the oﬀering and provision of consumer ﬁnancial products or
services under the Federal consumer ﬁnancial laws.”169 It was a response to
the ﬁnancial distress wreaked on many citizens by consumer ﬁnancial
products during the recent economic crisis.170
Republicans have criticized the CFPB since it came into existence.171
President Obama’s decision to appoint Cordray through a recess appointment was prompted by a Republican ﬁlibuster of Cordray’s nomination.172
In 2012, Cordray’s appointment and other sections of the Dodd-Frank Act
were challenged in a lawsuit ﬁled by a Texas bank and two Washington,
D.C.-based business interest groups. 173 Several state attorneys general
subsequently joined as plaintiﬀs.174 Although the district court ultimately
dismissed plaintiﬀs’ claims on standing and ripeness grounds,175 if the Texas
bank (on appeal) or some other plaintiﬀ eventually reaches the merits of
Cordray’s appointment, it will likely prevail.
168 Pub. L. No. 111-���, ��� Stat. ���� (����) (to be codiﬁed at 12 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq.) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]; see also Linda Singer et al., Breaking Down Financial Reform: A Summary
of the Major Consumer Protection Portions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, 14 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 2 (2010) (providing a detailed exploration of Dodd-Frank).
169 Dodd-Frank Act § ����(a) (to be codiﬁed at 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a)).
170 See Leonard J. Kennedy et al., The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation for the Twenty-First Century, 97 C ORNELL L. R EV. 1141, 1144-45 (2012) (describing the
ﬁnancial crisis as the impetus for the creation of the CFPB).
171 See, e.g., Raghav Ahuja, Comment, Constitutional in Name: The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection and the Obama Administration's Treatment of the Nondelegation Principle and the
Appointments Clause, 14 U. P A. J. C ONST. L. 271, 272 (2011) (“Republicans in the House of
Representatives have introduced at least four bills aimed at limiting the Bureau's powers, and
numerous Republican Senators have threatened to ﬁlibuster the appointment of a permanent
Bureau director.” (footnotes omitted)).
172 See Helene Cooper & Jennifer Steinhauer, Bucking Senate, Obama Appoints Consumer Chief,
N.Y. T IMES (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/us/politics/richard-cordraynamed-consumer-chief-in-recess-appointment.html.
173 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 1-7, State Nat’l Bank of Big
Spring v. Geithner, No. 1:12-cv-01032 (D.D.C. June 21, 2012), decided sub nom. State Nat’l Bank of
Big Spring v. Lew, 2013 WL 3945027 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2013) (presenting several arguments, among
them that the CFPB violates the constitutional nondelegation doctrine and that Cordray’s
appointment was unconstitutional). But see Ahuja, supra note 171, at 272 (arguing that Congress’s
delegation of power to the CFPB and President Obama’s recess appointment of Elizabeth Warren
as Special Advisor for the CFPB were constitutional, even if questionable).
174 See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 23-28, State Nat’l
Bank, No. 1:12-cv-01032 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2012).
175 See State Nat’l Bank, 2013 WL 3945027, at *7-8.
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The result of that hypothetical challenge to CFPB action is somewhat
more complex than the result of the NLRB challenge. The CFPB is empowered to both take over the consumer protection duties of existing ﬁnancial
regulatory agencies176 and to exercise new powers created by Dodd-Frank.177
Until a Director takes control of the Bureau, the Secretary of the Treasury
is authorized to exercise the powers transferred to the CFPB from other
agencies.178 The Inspectors General of the Federal Reserve and Department
of Treasury found that those powers transferred to the CFPB on July 21,
2011. 179 These transferred powers included the authority to issue rules,
orders, and guidances that could have been made by the transferring agencies,
but did not include the authority to “prohibit unfair, deceptive, or abusive
acts or practices” under Dodd-Frank’s new coverage of consumer ﬁnancial
products or to ensure that features of those products “are fairly, accurately,
and eﬀectively disclosed” by providers.180 The CFPB would also be prevented
from regulating nondepository institutions until a Director took power.181
The CFPB’s actions since January 4, 2012 are thus challengeable for two
reasons. First, the exercise of the CFPB’s new powers will be voidable
because the congressional delegation of that authority was dependent on the
lawful appointment of a Director. Second, any CFPB actions that could have
been made by the Secretary of the Treasury in the interim period before a
Director took oﬃce will be voidable because those actions were taken by
Cordray, not the Secretary. It will also be impossible for the CFPB to claim
that its actions were made by an acting director, because Dodd-Frank
requires the holder of that position to “be appointed by the Director,”182
who, under Noel Canning’s logic, was never properly appointed himself.
176 Speciﬁcally, the CFPB assumed all consumer protection functions of the Federal Reserve
Board, the Oﬃce of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Oﬃce of Thrift Supervision, the
National Credit Union Administration, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as well as
some responsibilities of the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Housing and Urban
Development. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1061(b)(1)-(7) (to be codiﬁed at 12 U.S.C. § 5581(b)(1)-(7)).
177 At the core of its authority, the CFPB is empowered to issue regulations and take enforcement action to prevent “an unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice . . . in connection with any
transaction with a consumer for a consumer ﬁnancial product or service, or the oﬀering of a consumer
ﬁnancial product or service.” Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(a) (to be codiﬁed at 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a)).
178 See Dodd-Frank Act § ����(a) (to be codiﬁed at �� U.S.C. § ����(a)).
179 B D . OF G OVERNORS OF THE F ED . R ESERVE S YS . & B UREAU OF C ONSUMER F IN .
P ROT., O FFICES OF INSPECTOR G EN., D EP’T OF THE T REASURY, R EVIEW OF CFPB
IMPLEMENTATION P LANNING A CTIVITIES 2-4 (2011), available at http://www.federalreserve.
gov/oig/ﬁles/OIG_����_Review_of_CFPB_Implementation_Planning_Activities.pdf.
180 Id. at 3-4.
181 Id. at 4.
182 Dodd-Frank Act § ����(b)(�) (to be codiﬁed at 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(5)).
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If Noel Canning remains law, all of the CFPB’s actions since Cordray’s
recess appointment could potentially be vulnerable to challenge. Despite
initial signs that Republicans would continue to prevent the appointment of
a Director, 183 the Senate’s oﬃcial conﬁrmation of Cordray in July ����
should insulate future CFPB action from attack.
C. Potential Impact on the Federal Judiciary
Of course, Noel Canning did not directly address the recess appointment
of Article III judges, but the decision’s reasoning would seem to apply with
equal force in that context. Since the Reagan Administration, only three
Article III judges have taken the bench through recess appointments,184 but
more than 300 such appointments have been made throughout the history
of the United States.185
President Clinton appointed Judge Roger Gregory to a position on the
Fourth Circuit during an intersession recess in December 2000.186 Gregory
was later nominated to the same seat by President George W. Bush and
conﬁrmed by the Senate,187 but because he was appointed to a newly created
seat188 that had been vacant long before the recess began, his service in the
interim would be unconstitutional under Noel Canning. President Bush’s
intersession recess appointment of Judge Charles W. Pickering to the Fifth
Circuit would be unconstitutional for the same reason.189 Judge William H.
183 See Michael R. Crittenden, Nomination Revives Fight over Consumer Bureau, WSJ. COM
W ASH. W IRE (Feb. 13, 2013, 4:28 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/02/13/nominationrevives-ﬁght-over-consumer-bureau (noting “no willingness” from Republicans to approve
Cordray’s nomination because “[t]hey simply don’t want that kind of Wall Street oversight”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
184 See Hogue Memo, supra note 10, at 20, 22, 27 (noting the recess appointments of U.S.
Court of Appeals Judges Roger Gregory, William H. Pryor, and Charles W. Pickering).
185 Herz, supra note 19, at 449.
186 Hogue Memo, supra note 10, at 20. See generally Sarah Wilson, Appellate Judicial Appointments During the Clinton Presidency: An Inside Perspective, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 29, 40-42 (2003)
(explaining the Clinton Administration’s procedure and rationale for appointing Judge Gregory).
187 See Alison Mitchell, Senators Conﬁrm � Judges, Including Once-Stalled Black, N.Y. T IMES
(July 21, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/21/us/senators-conﬁrm-3-judges-including-oncestalled-black.html.
188 The seat was created by the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650,
§ 202(a)(�), ��� Stat. ����, ���� (codiﬁed as amended at �� U.S.C. § ��(a) (����)). The Noel
Canning court did not directly address the issue of recess appointments to a newly created
position, but its logic suggests no reason to treat those positions diﬀerently.
189 See Hogue Memo, supra note 10, at 27. The seat had been vacant since Judge Henry A.
Politz assumed senior status in 1999. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Politz, Henry
Anthony, F ED. JUD. C ENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1902 (last visited Sept. 19,
2013). Judge Pickering was nominated for a permanent position by President Bush, but because
the Senate refused to conﬁrm him, he resigned as his recess appointment was about to expire. See
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Pryor’s intrasession recess appointment was upheld in an en banc decision
of the Eleventh Circuit,190 but would be doubly damned under Noel Canning
because the vacancy existed before the start of the recess191 and the recess
occurred in the middle of a session. Eventually, President Bush oﬃcially
nominated Judge Pryor and he was conﬁrmed roughly sixteen months after
his recess appointment.192 Any ruling he made in the interim period could
potentially be challenged.193
If the rationale of Noel Canning becomes binding law nationwide, it
could contribute to the already disastrous problem of judicial vacancies.
Notably, the “nuclear option” threatened by Senate Majority Leader Harry
Reid would not have altered Senators’ ability to ﬁlibuster judicial nominees. 194 Under Noel Canning, a dedicated minority of forty-one Senators
could theoretically ﬁlibuster all judicial nominees and maintain pro forma
sessions to foreclose any recess appointments. This hypothetical is hardly
far-fetched considering the recent behavior of both Republican and Democratic Senate leaders. 195 President George W. Bush promised to cease
further judicial recess appointments in exchange for conﬁrmation of twentyﬁve of his judicial nominees.196 Especially in light of the new forces pulling
federal judges away from the bench, 197 might the eﬀective repeal of the
Recess Appointments Clause exacerbate the existing vacancy crisis in the

Adam Liptak, A Judge Appointed by Bush After Impasse in Senate Retires, N.Y. T IMES (Dec. 10,
2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/10/politics/10pickering.html.
190 See Evans v. Stephens, ��� F.�d ���� (��th Cir. ����) (en banc) (ﬁnding Judge Pryor’s
recess appointment constitutional and dismissing the reasoning that now forms the basis of the
decision in Noel Canning).
191 The seat had been vacant since Judge Emmett R. Cox assumed senior status in 2000. See
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Cox, Emmett Ripley, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/
servlet/nGetInfo?jid=522 (last visited Sept. 19, 2013).
192 See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Pryor, William Holcombe Jr., FED. JUD. CENTER,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=3050 (last visited Sept. 19, 2013).
193 See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the de facto oﬃcer doctrine.
194 Senator Reid had threatened to change the Senate’s ﬁlibuster rules for executive branch
nominees to allow for conﬁrmation by a simple majority of ﬁfty-one votes, but the ﬁlibuster rules
for legislation and judicial appointments would have remained unaﬀected. See Manu Raju et al.,
Senate Heads Toward ‘Nuclear Option,’ POLITICO (July 16, 2013), http://www.politico.com/story/
2013/07/senate-nears-nuclear-option-showdown-94156.html.
195 See Carl W. Tobias, Postpartisan Federal Judicial Selection, 51 B.C. L. REV. 769, 772-73 (2010)
(exploring the role of increased partisan politics in slowing conﬁrmations of judicial nominees).
196 See Neil A. Lewis, Deal Ends Impasse over Judicial Nominees, N.Y. T IMES (May 19, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/19/us/deal-ends-impasse-over-judicial-nominees.html.
197 See Stephen B. Burbank et al., Leaving the Bench, 1970-2009: The Choices Federal Judges
Make, What Inﬂuences Those Choices, and Their Consequences, 161 U. P A. L. R EV. 1, 12-19 (2012)
(studying the forces that tend to push federal judges to leave the bench).
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federal judiciary? 198 This is a particularly serious policy concern because
increased workloads may already be reducing the rigor of judicial review,199
and Republicans in the Senate continue to ﬁlibuster Obama nominees to
the federal courts.200
D. Supreme Court Review and Other Litigation
The NLRB and the Obama Administration did not petition the D.C.
Circuit to rehear the case en banc. 201 Challengers to President Obama’s
recess appointments were emboldened by Noel Canning, but by the time the
case was decided, similar cases were already pending in a majority of the
other circuits.202 In deciding those cases, two additional circuits embraced
the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit’s Noel Canning opinion.203 In a similar
case, a nursing home asked the Supreme Court to stay a district court order
enforcing an NLRB injunction, or in the alternative, to grant certiorari and
review the issue itself.204 The Court declined.205 Still, most commentators
198 A diverse collection of legal organizations agrees that prolonged vacancies on federal
courts pose a threat to eﬀective and eﬃcient justice. See, e.g., Russell Wheeler, Is Our Dysfunctional
Process for Filling Judicial Vacancies an Insoluble Problem? (discussing the current judicial vacancy
crisis and proposing possible solutions), in T OWARD A M ORE P ERFECT U NION: A P ROGRESSIVE B LUEPRINT FOR THE S ECOND T ERM (Am. Constitution Soc’y ed., 2013), available at
http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/ﬁles/Wheeler_-_Filling_Judicial_Vacancies.pdf; Judicial Vacancies
Slow the Wheels of Justice, PRW EB (July 12, 2010), http://www.prweb.com/releases/
2010/07/prweb4248044.htm (expressing the ABA President’s displeasure at widespread judicial
vacancies); see also Reid Alan Cox et al., Filibusters and the Constitution, F EDERALIST S OC’Y FOR
L. & P UB. P OL’Y S TUD. (2007), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20070325_
Filibusters.pdf (addressing the constitutional issues raised by the common practice of ﬁlibustering
judicial nominations in the Senate).
199 See Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 H ARV . L. R EV . 1109, 1127-37 (2011) (using an
empirical analysis to argue that overburdened circuit courts necessarily treat appeals with
diminished scrutiny).
200 See Carl Hulse, Blocked Bids to Fill Judgeships Stir New Fight on Filibuster, N.Y. T IMES
(Mar. �, ����), http://www.nytimes.com/����/��/��/us/politics/ﬁlibuster-stirs-a-new-battle-on-usjudges.html (discussing the continued ﬁlibuster of the President’s D.C. Circuit nominees).
201 Charlie Savage, Recess Appointments Ruling to Be Appealed, N.Y. T IMES (Mar. 12, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/13/us/politics/obama-to-appeal-ruling-curbing-recess-appointments.html.
202 See Lyle Denniston, Spreading Challenge to Appointment Power, SCOTUS BLOG (Jan. 28,
2013, 4:30 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/01/spreading-challenge-to-appointment-power
(noting that the constitutional controversy over the President’s recess appointments had spread to
“all but three of the federal courts of appeals”).
203 See NLRB v. Enter. Leasing Co. Se., 722 F.3d 609, 647 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he term ‘the Recess’ means the intersession period of time between an adjournment sine die and the start of the Senate's
next session.”); NLRB v. New Vista Nursing & Rehab., 719 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2013) (“We hold that
‘the Recess of the Senate’ in the Recess Appointments Clause refers to only intersession breaks.”).
204 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1-2, HealthBridge Mgmt., LLC v. Kreisberg, 133 S. Ct.
1002 (2013) (No. 12A769), 2013 WL 417696.
205 See HealthBridge Mgmt., 133 S. Ct. at 1002 (denying application for stay and denying certiorari).
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agreed that the Court would eventually have to settle the conﬂict between
the circuits.206 Even respondent Noel Canning agreed that the Court should
grant certiorari to settle “a constitutional question of extreme importance.”207
On June 24, 2013, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the
D.C. Circuit’s decision during October Term 2013.208 Petitioners, the NLRB
and the Solicitor General, asked the Court to consider two questions:
1. Whether the President’s recess-appointment power may be exercised
during a recess that occurs within a session of the Senate, or is instead limited to recesses that occur between enumerated sessions of the Senate.
2. Whether the President’s recess-appointment power may be exercised to
ﬁll vacancies that exist during a recess, or is instead limited to vacancies
that ﬁrst arose during that recess.209

In granting certiorari, the Court added an additional question for deliberation. The Court asked the litigants to consider “[w]hether the President’s
recess-appointment power may be exercised when the Senate is convening
every three days in pro forma sessions.”210 The Court’s decision to present a
third question suggests it might consider following a narrower path toward
invalidating President Obama’s recess appointments.
Noel Canning has attracted signiﬁcant coverage in the academic and popular press.211 Despite the breadth and depth of analysis, however, the outcome
206 See, e.g., T ODD G ARVEY & D AVID H. C ARPENTER , C ONG . R ESEARCH S ERV .,
R43030, T HE R ECESS A PPOINTMENT P OWER A FTER N OEL C ANNING V. NLRB: C ONSTITUTIONAL I MPLICATIONS 13 (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43030.pdf
(“These diﬀerences [among various circuits’ interpretations] are substantial and may provide a
strong justiﬁcation for the Supreme Court to grant review of this case.” (footnote omitted)); Lyle
Denniston, Broad Limit on Appointments Urged, SCOTUSBLOG (May 23, 2013, 5:21 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/05/broad-limit-on-appointments-urged (“There has been no
doubt that the Justices would eventually take on the dispute, which would lead the Court into a
fundamental inquiry about constitutional meaning.”).
207 Brief of Respondent Noel Canning at 9, NLRB v. Noel Canning, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013)
(No. 12-1281), 2013 WL 2279703.
208 Noel Canning, 133 S. Ct. at 2861.
209 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at I, Noel Canning, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (No. 12-1281), 2013
WL 1771081.
210 Noel Canning, 133 S. Ct. at 2862.
211 See, e.g., Nicole Schwartzberg, What Is a "Recess"?: Recess Appointments and the Framers'
Understanding of Advice and Consent, 28 J.L. & P OL. 231 (2013) (providing a thorough analysis of
the proper interpretation of “the Recess”); Peter Strauss, Reaction, The Pre-Session Recess, 126
H ARV. L. R EV. F. 130, 130-31 (2013) (rejecting the formalism of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion given
the practical realities of the Founding era); Cass R. Sunstein, Reaction, Originalism v. Burkeanism:
A Dialogue over Recess, 126 H ARV. L. R EV. F. 126 (2013) (analyzing the case through a hypothetical
dialogue between the two interpretive philosophies); Adrian Vermeule, Reaction, Recess Appointments
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of the case before the Supreme Court is unpredictable. A superﬁcial view of
the case suggests that the issue might be decided along purely partisan lines.
Over the long run, however, it is not clear which party would beneﬁt from a
more expansive reading of the Recess Appointments Clause.212 There are a
number of additional ideological divides at the core of Noel Canning. Should
the Court view the issues through a purely originalist lens, or follow a
Burkean approach based on the practices of the last two centuries?213 The
case also asks the Justices to calibrate the balance of power between the
executive and legislative branches—an issue that divides the Court, but not
necessarily along predictable partisan lines. 214 Such crosscutting interests
complicate eﬀorts to predict the outcome of the case.
Prognosticators face an additional challenge because the Supreme Court
might resolve the case in a number of diﬀerent ways. At the extremes, the
Court could aﬃrm the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in its entirety or reverse and
espouse the reasoning of Evans v. Stephens. Embracing either of these
options would do the most to settle the meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause. Because the D.C. Circuit’s opinion rests on alternative
grounds and because the Supreme Court granted certiorari on an additional
question, the Court would have to rule in the NLRB’s favor on each of the
three questions presented in order to reverse the D.C. Circuit.
The Court has a number of more subtle options as well. It could follow
Judge Griﬃth’s concurrence and reach only the ﬁrst constitutional question,
which would be suﬃcient to aﬃrm the decision below.215 The Court could also
and Precautionary Constitutionalism, 126 H ARV. L. R EV. F. 122, 122-23 (2013) (arguing that the D.C.
Circuit was overly concerned about the risks posed by a broad recess appointment authority);
Gerard Magliocca, Symposium: Listen to the Senate’s Recess Bell, SCOTUS BLOG (July 16, 2013, 2:06
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/07/symposium-listen-to-the-senates-recess-bell (“The Justices
should decide [the case] by deferring to the Senate’s interpretation of its rules and practices
governing recesses.”). The SCOTUSblog symposium provides a great deal of insightful analysis
in posts by Elizabeth Wydra and Professors James Flug, Edward Hartnett, Michael Herz, and
Victor Williams, among others. See Symposium, National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning,
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-ﬁles/cases/national-labor-relations-board-v-noel-canning/
(last visited Sept. 19, 2013).
212 Presidents from both parties have used the power aggressively. See supra note 48 and
accompanying text. Intelligent political actors should realize that they are “behind a sort of
Rawlsian veil of ignorance” because of the reality that “[a] given interpretation may be good for
your team at one point in history and bad at another.” Herz, supra note 19, at 443.
213 See Sunstein, supra note 211 (providing a thorough exploration of this dichotomy through
a hypothetical dialogue).
214 For instance, Justices Scalia and Kagan disagree on many issues, but both worked in the
White House and have argued for relatively tight presidential control over independent agencies.
See Robert V. Percival, Who's in Charge? Does the President Have Directive Authority over Agency
Regulatory Decisions?, 79 F ORDHAM L. R EV. 2487, 2488-89 (2011).
215 See supra Part II.D.
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take a minimalist approach and skirt the core constitutional issues. It could
defer to the Senate’s constitutional power to set its own rules,216 and ﬁnd that
the pro forma sessions were suﬃcient to block any recess appointments,
without reaching the more sweeping conclusions of the D.C. Circuit.217
Some commentators have urged the Court to determine that the issues are
nonjusticiable political questions.218 After all, the Senate eventually conﬁrmed
President Obama’s nominee, Richard Cordray, as CFPB Director. Perhaps
the Supreme Court acts most “wisely” when it steps back and permits the
other branches’ “political and institutional incentives and disincentives to
operate, as they were intended, to curb overreach by [an]other branch.”219
The current quorum at the NLRB suggests yet another potential minimalist resolution. The subsequent nomination and conﬁrmation of NLRB
members did not render Noel Canning moot, because the NLRB loses
jurisdiction to resolve a case once the record transfers to a federal court.220
In an interesting twist, then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan addressed this
mootness question and reached the same conclusion in a letter written while
the Supreme Court was considering the issue of whether the NLRB could
act without a three-person quorum.221 Solicitor General Kagan argued that
the case was not moot, but that it remained “unclear whether the Board
has the authority to ‘ratify’ the two-member decisions en masse without
reconsidering each case individually.” 222 Although the then-Solicitor
General counseled against a blanket ratiﬁcation, 223 some commentators
believe the Supreme Court could remand Noel Canning to the NLRB, which
could then take “oﬃcial notice” of the original proceedings before the Board
216
217
218

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings . . . .”).
See Magliocca, supra note 211 (providing a careful explanation of this argument).
See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, In NLRB Recess Appointments Case, Roberts Court Can Now Show
It Knows How to Exercise Judicial Restraint, B LOOMBERG BNA D AILY R EP. FOR E XECUTIVES 1,
3 (July 29, 2013), http://shanereactions.ﬁles.wordpress.com/����/��/peter-shane-argument-forjudicial-restraint-in-recess-appointments-cases.pdf (encouraging the Court to ﬁnd that the case
presents “questions that the Court regards as constitutionally left to the elected branches of
government to decide for themselves”).
219 Id.
220 See John Elwood, Could Senate Action After Cloture Reform Moot Noel Canning?, V OLOKH
C ONSPIRACY (July 12, 2013, 11:52 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/07/12/could-senate-actionafter-cloture-reform-moot-noel-canning (citing 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)).
221 See Letter from Elena Kagan, Solicitor Gen., to William K. Suter, Clerk, U.S. Supreme
Court (Apr. 26, 2010), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/SGletter-brief-NLRB-4-26-10.pdf (arguing New Process Steel, L.P. v. National Labor Relations Board,
130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010), had not been rendered moot by the subsequent appointment of two
additional members to the NLRB).
222 Id. at 2.
223 See id.
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and reaﬃrm the Board’s decision.224 This solution would allow the Court to
completely avoid the thorny constitutional issues at play. Yet these minimalist approaches would leave the deﬁnition of the Recess Appointments
Clause unclear and subject to further intercircuit conﬂict.
Each of these paths leads to markedly diﬀerent practical results for the
President’s power to ﬁll vacancies.
C ONCLUSION
The Noel Canning decision is well reasoned and well researched. It presents
a convincing argument for the original purpose of the Recess Appointments
Clause in light of the Founders’ intent. But it also contradicts the decisions
of three federal courts of appeals, a long history of executive practice, and at
least some congressional acquiescence. Noel Canning is motivated by intense
dedication to separation of powers, originalism, and the judiciary’s role as
referee of constitutional boundaries. It conﬂicts with court decisions and
commentators who value pragmatic, functional government.
Both sides appeal to what they believe is the ultimate purpose of the
Recess Appointments Clause. Supporters of Noel Canning’s reasoning point
to the original purpose of the clause as a secondary backstop in a time when
the Senate was in recess more than it was in the capital. Opponents point to
the clause’s general purpose as a lubricant to facilitate the smooth functioning of government. Although the Noel Canning debate is often framed in
partisan terms—three judges appointed by Republican presidents invalidating President Obama’s labor appointments225—it is worth remembering that
in the span of a single decade, Democrats and Republicans have both
objected to, and defended, the Recess Appointments Clause.
The Supreme Court now faces the same choice between competing values.
The Court’s decision will have signiﬁcant consequences for the future of presidential power, governmental eﬃciency, and the Recess Appointments Clause itself.
Preferred Citation: James M. Hobbs, Case Note, The Future of Recess Appointments
After the Decision of the D.C. Circuit in Noel Canning v. NLRB, 162 U. PA. L. REV.
ONLINE 1 (2013), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/162-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-1.pdf.
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See Shane, supra note 218, at 1.
Cf. Cary Coglianese, Presidential Control of Administrative Agencies: A Debate over Law or
Politics?, 12 U. P A. J. C ONST. L. 637, 645 (2010) (arguing, in the context of presidential control
over agencies, that “[j]udgments about policy outcomes not surprisingly aﬀect judgments about
presidential power[:] . . . [a]lthough partisans invoke the Constitution to bolster their claims,
ultimately politics underlies criticisms of Presidents for exercising too much power”).

